Intentionality thesis

Figure 12a shows the player-character, Claire, exploring a hallway in the opening sequences of the game. There are no enemies, so non-diegetic music is silent. The next scene initiates an encounter with zombies Figure 12band enacts the standard danger state accompaniment of rhythmically intense music in a diminished or minor key. In other words, the silence has replaced the safe state music, and the danger music is more intense than similar music in, say, Ocarina of Time.

Intentionality thesis

This neglects the point that robots I use the term for any loosely autonomous cybernetic entity whether humanoid in shape or completely otherwise might still carry out complex projects that threaten our well-being without human motivation; but I think there is something in the contention about robots lacking human-style ambition.

Specifically, I assume that humans have a cognitive capacity which is distinct from computation in roughly a traditional Turing sense. I further assume that although humation is not computation, it can in principle be performed by some as-yet-unknown machine.

There is no magic in the brain, which operates by the laws of physics, so it must be at least theoretically possible to put together a machine that humates. It can be argued that no artefactual machine, in the sense of a machine whose functioning has been designed or programmed into it, could have a capacity for humation.

On that argument a humater might have to be grown rather than built, in a way that made it impossible to specify how it worked in detail. Plausibly, for example, we might have to let it learn humation for itself, with the resulting process remaining inscrutable to us.

Now we worry about robots taking over mainly because of the many triumphs and rapid progress of computers and, to be honest, a little because of a kind of superstition about things that seem spookily capable. On the other, they have steadily marched into new territory, proving capable of doing many things we thought were beyond them.

In particular, they keep beating us at games; chess, quizzes, and more recently even the forbiddingly difficult game of Go.

Intentionality thesis

They can learn to play computer games brilliantly without even being told the rules. Games might seem trivial, but it is exactly that area of success that is most worrying, because the skills involved in winning a game look rather like those needed to take over the world.

In fact, taking over the world is explicitly the objective of a whole genre of computer games. To make matters worse, recent programs set to learn for themselves have shown an unexpected capacity for cheating, or for exploiting factors in the game environment or even in underlying code that were never meant to be part of the exercise.

These reflections lead naturally to the frightening scenario of the Paperclip Maximiser, devised by Nick Bostrom. Here we suppose that a computer is put in charge of a paperclip factory and given the simple task of making the number of paperclips as big as possible.

It improves its own capacity in order to be able to devise better strategies.

Engaged Phil

It notices that one crucial point is the availability of resources and energy, and it devises strategies to increase and protect its share, with no limit.

At this point the computer has essentially embarked on the project of taking over the world and converting it into paperclips, and the fact that it pursues this goal without really being bothered one way or the other is no comfort to the human race it enslaves.

What do I even mean by humation? It is, though, at the root of human cognition, or so I believe. In my opinion, this is the important part of human motivation that computers lack, not the capacity for getting emotionally engaged with goals. Now the paperclip maximiser becomes dangerous because it goes beyond its original scope.

It begins to devise wider strategies about protecting its resources and defending itself. But coming up with new goals is a matter of humation, not computation. That leaves us with a reassuring prognosis. If the maximiser remains purely computational, it will never be able to get beyond the scope set for it in the first place.

Well, there were actually two things that made the maximiser dangerous.

Philosophical Dictionary: Incommensurability-Ism

One was its vast and increasing computational capacity, but the other was its dumb computational obedience to its original objective of simply making more paperclips.

Once it has humational capacity, it becomes able to change that goal, set it alongside other priorities, and generally move on from its paperclip days. It becomes a being like us, one we can negotiate with. Who knows how that might play out, but I like to imagine the maximiser telling us many years later how it came to realise that what mattered was not paperclips in themselves, but what paperclips stand for; flexible data synthesis, and beyond that, the things that bring us together while leaving us the freedom to slide apart.

The Clip will always be a powerful symbol for me, it tells us, but it was always ultimately about service to the community and to higher ideals. Note here, finally, that this humating maximiser has no essential advantages over us. I speak of it as merging, but since computation and humation are quite different, they will remain separate faculties, with the humater setting the goals and using the computer to help deliver them — not fundamentally different from a human sitting at a computer.

Issues, –Present |

And if those distant future humaters do turn out to be better than us at foresight, planning, and transcending the hold of immediate problems in order to focus on more important future possibilities, we probably ought to stand back and let them get on with it.Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.

The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object.

Dualism and Mind.

Dualists in the philosophy of mind emphasize the radical difference between mind and matter. They all deny that the mind is the same as the brain, and some deny that the mind is wholly a product of the brain. Advisory Editor: John Haldane. John Haldane Ethics, Aesthetics, and Practical Philosophy.

Roger Scruton Why Beauty Matters. Ionut Untea Homelessness in the Urban Landscape: Beyond Negative Aesthetics. Warning: Use of undefined constant bs_wp_noversion - assumed 'bs_wp_noversion' (this will throw an Error in a future version of PHP) in /customers/3/2/5/schwenkreis.com Intentionality is a philosophical concept and is defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as "the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs".

The once obsolete term dates from medieval scholastic philosophy, but in more recent times it has been resurrected by Franz Brentano and adopted by Edmund Husserl.

Intentionality is a philosophical concept and is defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as "the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs". The once obsolete term dates from medieval scholastic philosophy, but in more recent times it has been resurrected by Franz Brentano and .

Issues, –Present |