Comparing the differences between the single member district plurality and the alternative vote elec

Percentages do not add up to because not all parties are included.

Comparing the differences between the single member district plurality and the alternative vote elec

Show Context Citation Context The relationship between legislative seats and citizen votes is a longstanding concern in democratic theory e. Constitutionally mandated reapportionment and shifting patterns of partisanship have cr Carrubba - American Journal of Political Science" In parliamentary democracies, participating in government provides access to office perks and policy influence.

Because of this, as Riker demonstrated, there is a powerful logic behind the formation of minimum winning coalitions. Thus, an important question is why we regularly observe oversiz Thus, an important question is why we regularly observe oversized coalitions.

While several theories of coalition formation have been proposed, few have been tested in competition with one another.

Comparing the differences between the single member district plurality and the alternative vote elec

This article offers a simultaneous test of five main theories of coalition formation using data from 24 countries over the period from to The weight of the evidence suggests that oversized governments form when maintaining coalition bargains is harder Carrubba and Volden Finally, while we descriptively observe oversized connected coalitions Axelrodthe logic behind their formation appears to differ from what Axelrod proposes.

InWilliam Riker argued powerfully for the expectation that governments should form minimum winning coalitions. Adding more parties would only force the otherwise minimum winning coalition MWC to give up benefits unnecessarily. Scarritt - American Political Science Review" Do electoral institutions and ethnopolitical cleavages shape the structure of party systems sepa-rately or jointly?

We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the numberof electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables district magnitude and prox-imity of pre We examine the independent, additive, and interactive effects on the numberof electoral and legislative parties of two institutional variables district magnitude and prox-imity of presidential and legislative electionsone intervening variable effective number of presidential candidatesand two new measures of ethnopolitical cleavages based on constructivist specification of ethnopolitical groups fragmentation and concentration.

Ethnopolitical fragmentation independently reduces the number of parties but, interactively with ethnopolitical concentration, increases it. However, the additive and interactive combinations of both measures with electoral institutions explain the largest amount of variance in the number of parties.

Do electoral institutions and ethnopoliticalcleavages shape the structure the fragmenta-tion or concentration of party systems sepa-rately or jointly?

If they shape the structure of party systems jointly, how can this joint effect be theoreti- Show Context Citation Context And proportional formulas predictably tend to increase the number of parties but only in ethnically heterogeneous societies and not in ethnically homogeneous ones Ordeshook and Shvetsova A growing consensus has emerged that proportional democracies produce more ideological congruence be-tween their citizens and representatives than majoritarian democracies.

But is this consensus open to ques-tion? We argue that it is. As we demonstrate, empirical results regarding ideological congru As we demonstrate, empirical results regarding ideological congruence are likely to depend on exactly how scholars conceptualize and measure it.

In addition to clarifying various aspects of how scholars currently conceptualize ideological congruence, we introduce a new conceptualization and measure of congruence that captures a long tradition in democratic theory emphasizing the ideal of having a legislature that accurately reflects the preferences of the citizenry as a whole.

Our new measure is the direct counterpart for ideological congruence of the vote-seat disproportionality measures so heavily used in comparative studies of representation. Using particularly appropriate data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we find that governments in proportional democracies are not substantively more congru-ent than those in majoritarian democracies.

Proportional democracies are, however, characterized by more representative legislatures.In the middle of the spectrum, single-member–simple-plurality (SMSP) (that is, first-past-the-post), and single-member–alternative- vote or double-ballot systems promote a mixture of partisan and candi-.

In parliamentary systems election, 62 of seats in the legislature were won with using single-member district plurality, this is seldom the less than 20 percent of the vote, and 15 of these were won case.

in , prescribes a single-district, multi-member plurality system for municipalities with fewer than 3, inhabitants and a form of “fortified” proportional representation for those with 3, or more inhabitants. single-member district plurality. This evidence should not be interpreted as support for the case for categorical choice-based electoral systems: it only shows that one.

It is most common to think of plurality in the context of single-member plurality elections, but we can also have plurality-based outcomes in a multi-seat district, with the most common form of such an electoral rule called plurality bloc voting, in which each voter may cast a single vote for M (or up to M) candidates.

may be sought in single-member seats, with votes initially cast for less popu- lar candidates being distributed to other candidates until one secures an absolute majority of votes (the 'alternative vote').

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