An interpretation to reach the crux of nietzsches argument about will to power

Thus, what unifies Nietzsche's seemingly disparate critical remarks — about altruism, happiness, pity, equality, Kantian respect for persons, utilitarianism, etc. Indeed, when we turn to the details of Nietzsche's criticisms of these norms we find that, in fact, this is precisely what he argues. One detailed example will have to suffice here. An early remark of Nietzsche's suggests his answer:

An interpretation to reach the crux of nietzsches argument about will to power

Thinking out loud about Nietzsche's philosophy Tuesday, July 13, Katsafanas on "Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology" So our regular Nietzsche reading group here at U of C has been thinned out by summer, but those of us still around have decided to read some secondary literature, starting with the illuminating paper by Paul Katsafanas BU on " Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology " that will appear in The Oxford Handbook, which I guess will be out in The comments that follow are mine, and should not be imputed to the other members of the group, though I do want to acknowledge them since I learned from the opportunity to discuss the paper with them: I will be flagging this post for them and Paul, in case they want to weigh in with additional thoughts or replies.

I've already sent Paul comments on some minor matters in the current versionso I won't dwell on those issues here though may flag one or two in passing in case anyone wants to pursue them in the comments.

Brian Leiter's Nietzsche Blog: Katsafanas on "Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology"

The key question is what exactly are "drives" for Nietzsche. This strikes me as correct, and so I will not dwell on it here. Bear in mind that K's own preferred reading is a kind of dispositional view: This is closely related to the view Richardson defended originally in Nietzsche's System, though K's criticism of the view at p.

It is true that in later work Richardson tries to treat the dispositions of drives in selectionist terms there are pertinent criticisms of that general interpretive strategy here and here. As I've already pointed out to Paul, there is no reason to think that natural selection will necessarily produce ascetics "disposed Despite the fact that the agent is strongly disposed toward sexual activity, we would typically say that the agent does not value sexual activity" p.

But all this requires us to say is that the drives i. Indeed, I take it such a solution is compatible with K's preferred view. But even the weaker claim is not a platitude, and the fact that Kant was ready to bite the bullett on the possibility that no one ever acts morally because it might be that no one ever acts for the right kinds of reasons hardly show this to be a platitude.

The Cartesian picture of the self, of its essential transparency, reverberates throughout modern philosophy, all the way to the present, though since Freud's triumph, probably more thinkers would be prepared to sign on to the skeptical view.


I let pass in silence the strange discussion of what wolves and flies know about their actions at p. I accept this as a more precise way of stating the point I was making in NOM, i. This may well be the right way to gloss N's skepticism about the sources of agency.

Section 3 "The nature of Nietzschean drives" is the core of the paper, and quite illuminating, until p.

An interpretation to reach the crux of nietzsches argument about will to power

This is the point at which I wonder about the connection between drives and affects. K's discussion resonates with recent work by a former student, Neil Sinhababu, on the Humean theory of motivation, which emphasizes the role of desire in affecting salience: Neil, as readers of the blog will know, is also interested in the similarities between the Nietzschean and Humean views.

Here is K's summary statement at the end of 3. There are two important features of drives on the Freudian view. First, drives have a kind of constancy that other desires do not--"they arise, with some regularity throughout the individual's life" p. The music you desired to listen to in your 20s may no longer appeal in your 40s; but the hunger drive keeps coming back whether you are 20 or Second, drives do not depend on an external stimulus to be aroused.

External stimuli can give rise to a desire to eat or to have sex, to be sure, but those same deires can simply arise in the absence of any stimuli.First, in the works Nietzsche chose to publish, it seems clear that he did not, in fact, accept the doctrine in the strong form required for the N-Realist argument (namely, that it .

4 AYN RAND: The question

An Argument in Favor of John Locke's Philosophies. words. 2 pages. The Main Ideas of Historical Materialism. 1, words. An Interpretation to Reach the Crux of Nietzsche's Argument About Will to Power.

2, words. Ressentiment is a distinct feature of slave morality, so rather than aspiring to power (or encouraging a will to power) humans are busy reproaching power. In this way, ambition becomes tied to greed and we become suspicious of achievement.

A will to power is what drives human behavior. Ayn Rand () was a Russian-American writer and philiosopher. She’s famous for her two novels, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, and creating a new system of philosophy called Objectivism.I didn’t know anything about her before adapting this quote but she seems to have lived a very interesting life.

If this crux interpretation falls, their understanding of Total Depravity is deficient. And if their understanding of Total Depravity is deficient, their entire five point system is shaky, to say the least.

Jul 13,  · The aggressive drive does not just produce a blind urge that causes the agent to act aggressively.

Rather, the aggressive drive manifests itself by producing desires, affects, and perceptual saliences that jointly inclidne the agent to see aggression as warranted by the circumstances.

The Matter of the Crux